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The Transitions to "Electoral" 
and Democratic Politics 
in Central America: 
Assessing the Role of Political Parties
Morris }. Blackman and Kenneth E. Sharpe
As the 1990s opened, the only country in Central America that could 
claim to hold periodic free and fair elections was Costa Rica. El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua all had held elections, but this 
inchoate "electoral politics" still fell considerably short of democratic 
politics. In general, there was little effective participation or broad-based 
representation and little political accountability between the elected 
officials and their supporters, and elected officials had limited power vis- 
A-vis a still-dominant military and, in some cases, a still-powerful 
oligarchy.
After colonial times in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, and 
Honduras powerful, entrenched classes led by landed interests (but also 
including commercial and financial elites) and powerful military 
institutions opposed, often brutally, groups that sought to create 
democratic political institutions. Following World War II, however, the 
defense of the existing land tenure system, of related economic interests, 
and of military power and privilege became more difficult, as important
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national and international changes created new social forces that 
demanded reform and democracy. When change failed to occur, many 
turned to revolution. As the structural conditions of the old system, 
what some have called "reactionary despotism," broke down, the landed 
and military elites reacted with a mixture of repression and largely 
cosmetic reforms in an effort to restore order and maintain their power 
and privilege.^ The "electoral politics" of the 1980s was part of this 
response.^ Only in Costa Rica, where the post-World War 11 transfor­
mations had an impact on political and class structure, was the pattern 
different.
In Central America we find three categories of electoral politics; 
pseudo, limited, and democratic. In pseudo electoral politics, there is a 
pretense of electoral democracy. The casting of ballots is conducted in a 
relatively free and fair manner, as is much of the counting of them. But 
certain segments of the population—particularly those on the left—are 
systematically excluded from participation (for example, in El Salvador 
in 1982). The electoral process is truncated by limited and unequal access 
to the media and the public. Those in power use intimidation and 
coercion to maintain control. Outcomes are also closely monitored so 
that ruling groups do not lose control over the political system or major 
policy decisions. The leadership is not accountable to the citizenry at 
large. To the extent accountability exists within the system, it does so 
among factions of the ruling groups.
In limited electoral politics, most groups in the society are permitted 
to participate. The casting and counting of ballots is conducted in a 
relatively free and fair manner. Candidates and parties have considerably 
greater access to the media and to the public. Intimidation and coercion 
have significantly diminished, but this reduction resulted from a political 
decision by the ruling groups; that decision, therefore, could be reversed 
at any time. Outcomes are respected, but the power of those elected to 
make significant changes in important policy areas is severely restricted. 
Those who hold office may have little power, and fundamental control 
of the system is not up for grabs (for example, in Honduras). Account­
ability of leadership to the citizenry is weakly maintained. Principal 
accountability is to the ruling groups.
Democratic electoral politics involves open participation in a free and 
fair electoral process. Voting and tallying the ballots is fair and free. 
Access to the media and to the public is not hampered by either overt 
nor tacit political restriction, nor is it limited by intimidation or coercion. 
Outcomes are respected, and control over the political system and its 
agenda is up for grabs at election time. The leadership is accountable to 
the electorate through the regularized periodic holding of elections.®
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The Pre-World War II Structure:
Reactionary Despotism
Baloyra uses the term reactionary despotism to describe the regimes of 
Central America that were based on landed interest and opposed to 
political and social modernization—that is, democracy and social reform. 
At the heart of reactionary despotism was what Weeks describes as a 
"system of land tenure and labor coercion that emerged during the 
nineteenth century, itself predicated upon authoritarianism. "*
It was not the concentration of land that was critical to this system but 
the coercive use of labor, which developed particularly in Guatemala, El 
Salvador, and, to a lesser extent, in Nicaragua. The landed oligarchies 
(concentrated particularly on large estates in Guatemala and El Salvador) 
relied on the state to ensure the large labor supply they needed in two 
ways. The state dispossessed peasants from the prime coffee lands, often 
using liberal land reform laws, which turned inalienable communal lands 
into private property. This not only provided the coffee growers with 
prime land, but also with a large, underemployed labor force. Second, 
the state created various coercive labor systems: debt peonage, labor 
contracts, and, later, vagrancy laws, as well as the colono system, in 
which landowners assigned plots to families in exchange for field labor 
when required.®
Thus, coffee production for the world market expanded, yet the 
commercialization of agriculture did not result in modern capitalist labor 
relations. Instead it resulted in coercive, often feudal, methods of labor 
control, and the landed interests depended heavily on a necessarily 
antidemocratic state and military to maintain these systems.
If recalcitrance to reform and democracy among Central American 
elites was shaped by the perceived need to maintain a coercive labor 
system supported by state repression, it was also reinforced by two other 
factors: the growth of a military with institutional interests of its own 
and U.S. intervention in the area. In El Salvador and Nicaragua, the 
military played a major role much earlier than in Guatemala or Hondu­
ras. El Salvador's oligarchy ceded considerable power to the military for 
decades following the 1932 massacre. In Guatemala and Honduras, the 
militaries did not take on a life or interests independent of economic 
elites until later. But officers in the high commands did assume economic 
and political interests that were not those of the oligarchies. They 
became involved in corruption and often practiced or condoned brutality. 
As a result, many of them developed suspicion, distrust, even fear of 
democratic reformers who might challenge their position or punish their 
actions.
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The United States often mediated or intervened in intra-elite disputes. 
Yet
because Washington demonstrated a willingness to use force to keep 
certain groups in power (having put them there in the first place in some 
cases), the ruling elites felt little pressure to accommodate the demands of 
the middle and lower classes for reform or even nominal political participa­
tion.*
Post-World War II;
Repression, Revolution, and "Electoral Politics"
Central America entered the post-World War II period with no 
country experiencing regular, free, and fair elections, let alone democ­
racy. With the exception of Costa Rica, the economic and military elites 
had at best little interest in democratic reforms (Honduras) and at worst 
were willing to use force and state repression against those who sought 
political or social reform (El Salvador, Nicaragua). In addition, aside from 
Costa Rica, the particular form of economic development they experi­
enced had not created an independent small farmer class, an economi­
cally strong or viable urban middle class, or an industrial/entrepreneurial 
group that might have organized to demand a political voice and social 
reform.
Yet important internal and world system changes beginning in the late 
1940s and early 1950s created a new historical conjuncture. With it came 
pressures for political and social change from new groups demanding 
social reform and political democracy. The different reactions of the 
nulitary and economic elites in each country generated patterns of 
repression, reform, and insurrection out of which emerged the forms of 
electoral politics present in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Four interrelated moments can be found in this conjuncture.
1. Transformation of the internal economic and class structure as a 
response to a changed relationship with the world capitalist system. In 
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s Central American military and economic 
elites used state power to change important relations of production. 
There was a diversification out of coffee and bananas into cotton, sugar, 
and cattle. The commercialization of agriculture favored those with 
access to capital or credit; thus, thousands of smallholders, squatters, 
and tenant farmers were forced from their lands. Concentration of 
landholding increased in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua as 
commercial agriculture worsened the problem of land scarcity.^
The creation of the Central American Common Market (CACM) in the 
early 1960s stimulated industrial growth without the major reforms
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necessary to redistribute income and create adequate markets in each 
individual country. CACM helped spur industri^ization and growth, 
and trade among the five sk)n-ocketed from $32 million in 1960 to $260 
million in 1969.® Such efforts to stimulate growth were pushed along by 
U.S. economic assistance under the Alliance for Progress. The structure 
reforms urged by the Alliance, however, were largely ignored.
Light industrialization created jobs but not in sufficient number to 
counteract rural dislocation and rapid population growth. Thus, years of 
rapid GNP growth were also paradoxically years of increasing inequality 
and joblessness.® These economic transformations put forward new 
social forces. The ntuddle class expanded. The urban labor force grew. 
Displaced peasants were forced to seek scarce work for low wages and 
swelled the numbers of underemployed rural wage laborers. Others 
moved to urban slums.
These new social forces were organized into new associations. Centrist 
and leftist political parties organized and demanded reforms and civilian 
government. Sometimes the military and the oligarchy responded with 
reactionary counterorganizations as they sought to create official parties 
or rule through existing parties. But in no country except Costa Rica did 
the reformist parties have the organization and power to play a major 
role in creating a transition to democratic electoral politics. In fact, it 
often fell to nonparty associations to organize the new social forces: labor 
unions, peasant organizations, and popular organizations, often building 
on comunidades de base, Christian base communities.
2, Transformation of the Catholic church. These base communities 
grew out of a revitalization of the church that began in the early 1960s 
with Vatican II and was reinforced by the conference of Latin Ainerican 
bishops at Medellin, Colombia, in 1968. The bishops denounced 
communism and capitalism as equal threats to human dignity and 
located causes for the region's misery and hunger in a social and 
economic structure dominated by the rich and powerful. Some factions 
in the church began to weld the poor and dispossessed into a new social 
force, organizing base communities, and called for a "preferential option 
for the poor.
3. Short-term cyclical economic trends in the early 1980s. Beginning in 
1979, economic decline engulfed the region. The causes were not limited 
to the inequalities, joblessness, exhaustion of the import substitution 
models, and uneven growth generated by the structural problems 
discussed above. More immediate short-term factors also worsened 
economic conditions and created severe internal pressures. One was the 
effect of the civil wars that wreaked havoc in El Salvador, Guatemala, 
and Nicaragua. A second was regional disintegration, much of it spurred 
by the civil wars that undermined regional trade and the growth it had
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promoted. Finally there were a series of external shocks: "a sharp 
deterioration in the terms of trade, declines in export volumes, and 
suddeiUy rising interest rates on international debt."“
4. Changing U.S. geopolitical concerns. Although U.S. hegemony in 
the international political and economic system has been declining, U.S. 
policy is still guided by a hegemonic strategic vision. The United States 
has been, at best, suspicious and, at worst, openly hostile to the popular 
organizations and parties of the left, driving forces for reform and 
change without which no large-scale democratic reform would have been 
possible. As a consequence, the United States neither supports these 
groups nor helps protect them from repression. At times, the United 
States even encouraged the forces of repression on the grounds that 
reformist groups and parties represented the opening wedge of 
communism. These policies often served to strengthen the very nulitaries 
whose opposition to reform blocked democracy in the first place. But 
there was a contradictory effect as well: the price of getting U.S. military 
and economic assistance was that the nulitary had to allow some politick 
opening.
Reactionary Despotism to "Electoral Politics"
The impact of these structural conditions depended on the reaction of 
landed and military elites in each country. There were two basic 
patterns. In Costa Rica and, to a lesser extent, Honduras the state was 
less coercive and the economic and military elites less powerful, less 
reactionary, and more open to elections, reform, and, especially in Costa 
Rica, democratic electoral politics. In El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Nicaragua powerful and recalcitrant economic elites, backed by increas­
ingly strong militaries and coercive states, met efforts at reform with 
brutal repression. The result was the outbreak of insurgencies and 
revolutions. In El Salvador and Guatemala the transition to pseudo 
electoral politics was part of the military's and the oligarchy's response 
to the problems created by civil wars (armed insurrections). In Nicara­
gua, the failure to respond with a transition to some form of electoral 
politics fanned the flames of revolution.
Pseudo or Limited Electoral Politics
The transition to democratic electoral politics in Costa Rica came in the 
late 1940s. It involved dismantling the military and establishing a broadly 
representative and reformist democratic welfare state. But in the other 
countries the potential transition, the opening for transition, appeared 
to come only in the early 1980s and was restricted to pseudo or, at best, 
limited electoral politics. This highly circumscribed transition resulted
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from internal pressure by parties and groups who sought full democracy 
but lacked the power to force such change. It also resulted from extern^ 
pressures by the United States that shaped the "willingness" of the 
military and authoritarian governments to allow the modest change.
In El Salvador the repression of reform efforts in 1979 and 1980 led to 
full-scale revolution, which the military then had difficulty containing. 
But the military's continuing desire for U.S. assistance led it to accept 
limited political changes, pseudo electoral politics, to show enough 
movement to overcome U.S. congressional reluctance to provide that 
aid. The role of the United States in creating this alternative was much 
more direct in El Salvador than in Guatemala.
In Guatemala the military was institutionalized, skilled, efficient, and 
not personalistic like Somoza's National Guard. It relied on brutal 
repression to destroy both reformers and mass organizations as well as 
to bring insurgents under control in the countryside. When order was 
restored and a military-authoritarian system institutionalized in the 
countryside, the military was willing to move toward pseudo electoral 
politics to resolve the severe economic difficulties created by its own 
policies and worsened by international isolation. Military leaders 
correctly thought that holding elections would overcome congressional 
refusal to provide economic or military assistance and gain them a 
certain legitimacy in Europe and Central America.
In Honduras the transition occurred without great organization or 
pressure from mass organizations. Parties played a more important role, 
but the military yielded primarily because of pressure from the Carter 
administration. In Nicaragua, the Somoza regime refused to yield to 
internal and external pressures for democratic reform. The consequence 
was a broad-based revolution. The transition to electoral politics in 
Nicaragua began in a postrevolutionary context.
With the exception of Costa Rica, one clear pattern emerged amid 
these variations: the reluctance of the military to allow a transition except 
as a way to get needed U.S. support, and then only under controlled 
circumstances that assure its continued dominance. The military allows 
the aperture because it is worried about its ability to handle increasing 
pressure from below, from social movements. At the same time it seeks 
to maintain an economic model that promises growth, legitimizes its 
rule, and does not disturb its allies among the economic elites. This in 
turn often demands external economic and military support. If the 
military's lack of international legitimacy threatens its ability to sustain 
its political and economic model or if its ability to control emerging social 
movements seems to be weakening, then it is likely to turn toward some 
form of electoral politics so as to avoid greater pressure, which might 
threaten it as an institution.
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Once the military decides to allow an electoral process and civilian 
government, it seeks to control and limit the transition process. The kind 
of control it seeks and its ability to achieve that control vary depending 
on the country's history, but we can make some broad generalizations 
about its intentions.
• The military will seek to exclude from the range of opposition 
parties any organizations that seek broad or rapid socioeconomic 
change or that are perceived as wanting to challenge the power 
and prerogatives of the military. The military will seek to work 
with those who seek legal-political changes, not structural ones.
• It will favor partial, interim changes—elections for a constituent 
assembly, elections for an interim president, and a vote on the 
constitution—rather sweeping reforms that include the election of 
a president or parliament.*^
• It will seek to limit the control of elected civilian regimes over the 
military, such as the power to punish military officers for past 
human rights abuses, to tame corruption, to end military 
sinecures, to control military budgets, or to determine military 
policy. They may do this by making pacts or agreements with 
those parties they will allow to take office.
In short, there is a pattern in the electoral strategies of the military. 
The military will define as "democratic" and "legitimate" those parties 
that do not threaten mass mobilization, demand structural transforma­
tion, or challenge military prerogatives. This excludes parties that would 
want to incorporate or organize the popular sectors and mass organiza­
tions and may even exclude democratic socialists. The military may use 
techniques to exclude these other groups such as refusal to grant them 
protection, repression (death squads, arrests, harassment, intimidation, 
disappearance, torture), and limited access to the media. The military 
will try to control the electoral calendar and slow, delay, or reverse the 
process if things seem to be getting out of control.*® The military might 
also try to control the balloting.
This permits us to suggest two hypotheses concerning the role of 
political parties in the transition process.
• Parties do not play a major role in creating the conditions for an 
electoral transition. But once the military and economic elites 
decide to allow the transition to take place, certain parties, 
especially moderate and centrist ones, can play an important role 
in organizing the electoral process and the transition.
• Because of the restrictions placed on the transition process by the 
military and dominant groups, parties are severely limited in their 
ability (1) to articulate a reform program that challenges the
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power of the military or threatens the basic socioeconomic 
structure, and (2) to establish effective working alliances with 
center-left or left parties or with mass organizations whose 
support might later be necessary to bring about major structural 
reforms. This puts the moderate parties in a vulnerable position 
on taking office. The political compromises these centrist parties 
must make to be able to participate in the process limits their 
power and, perhaps, their will to undertake the major socioeco­
nomic changes needed to move to democratic electoral politics.“
The Transition to Democratic Electoral Politics
In Costa Rica democratic electoral politics had already become firmly 
rooted in the years following the 1948 Revolution, llie transition to 
pseudo or limited electoral politics in the other four countries in the 
1980s thrust reformist, modernizing political parties into new prominence 
after decades of exclusion and, often, repression. But the transitions left 
those electoral systems still far from democratic. Further, the parties in 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras lacked the power and authority 
to grapple with the dilemmas they confronted, and even the much more 
powerful National Liberation Party in Costa Rica and the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua faced severe constraints.
The traditional yardstick for measuring progress toward democracy 
emphasizes the processes and procedures of Western democra­
cies—political parties, competitive elections, and a certain consensus 
about the rules of the game. The absence of these criteria show the 
serious defects in electoral politics in El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras. The problem has generally not been a lack of opposition 
parties to compete in elections but a failure on their part to aggregate 
emergent new interests. This leaves wide sectors among the peasantry, 
the unemployed, urban workers, and slum dwellers under- or unrepre­
sented.
One reason opposition parties have been unable to represent labor 
unions, peasant organizations, or other popular organizations is that the 
parties have been denied the opportunity to develop public support from 
these groups. The parties have not had adequate access to the press, and 
their members' ability to assemble, speak, and organize has too often 
been threatened by unwarranted arrest, torture, assassination, and 
disappearance.“
Worse, parties sometimes make pacts with those who have tradition­
ally monopolized power—the military and economic elites—thereby 
ensuring the continued exclusion of important sectors of the population. 
These pacts, whether unwritten or written, decide the distribution of
42 The Transitions to "Electoral" and Democratic Politics in Central America
power—who gets what, when, and how. The pact between El Salvador's 
Qiristian Democrats and the military immediately following Jos6 
Napoledn Duarte's election as president is one such example.
Electoral politics is further weakened by the personalism and 
factionalism so prevalent in many parties in the region. In the Central 
American context, this "reinforces the tendency toward internal 
competition and conflict resolution, rather than on purpose and problem 
solving. In this context, payoffs (political favors, jobs, unequal access to 
limited resources such as foreign exchange) are related back to groups 
competing for power, not forward to their consequences to society."^* 
Although the elections in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras did 
lead the military to step down from governmental office, it continues to 
rule behind the scenes in El Salvador and Guatemala and remains the 
major force in Honduras.^’’
Thus, the elected officials in these three countries are to a great extent 
figureheads; they are accountable to the military and, to some extent, the 
oligarchies and economic elites but not to the citizenry at large. Elected 
officials hold office but little power. They lack the power to carry out 
land reform or to tax and are often limited in their power to protect the 
basic freedoms of speech, assembly, and the press necessary for 
democratic practices. They cannot punish officers who have been 
involved in crimes; they cannot investigate and have difficulty stopping 
disappearances, torture, and assassinations. They cannot end military 
corruption or bring the military under civilian control. The exceptions are 
Costa Rica, where there is no military, and Nicaragua, where the ruling 
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) controlled the military before 
the 1990 election.
A hidden dynamic, however, is built into the present situation. The 
ability of the parties to sustain their status, let alone be the impetus for 
a transition toward electoral democracy, is shaped by their capacity to 
handle demands of their own supporters, who view the transition to 
pseudo or limited electoral politics not simply as a good in and of itself 
but as a mechanism for achieving reform. In each country there are 
demands for land reform, labor reform, and economic recovery. In El 
Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, there are demands to lift restric­
tions on civil liberties, to end human rights violations, and to bring the 
military under civilian control. In El Salvador and Guatemala there are 
also calls to find negotiated solutions to the armed conflicts. In Nicara­
gua conservatives have been demanding the military be freed from the 
control of the FSLN.
But the parties all face serious internal constraints in dealing with 
these often contradictory demands. At the same time the elections in 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have only given the parties
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office, not power, they have also created political openings that have 
enabled popular associations to organize and put forward their demands 
outside of narrow electoral channels. The parties are constrained in 
meeting those demands not only by the continued power of the military, 
but also by the limits the capitalist economy places on state action: 
failure to ensure an appropriate investment climate will lead to disinvest­
ment and economic deterioration.
In Nicaragua the constraints on the Sandinista government were 
shaped by both the Contra War and the need to deliver on reforms. 
Reforms were difficult to finance and were opposed by economically 
powerful opposition groups. The Chamorro government, victor in the 
1990 elections, is no longer constrained by the Contra War, but it is 
severely limited by economic devastation, created in large measure by 
that war and by the powerful demands for economic relief by the FSLN 
and popular organizations.
In addition, there are serious external constraints. Service payments 
on foreign debt drain much-needed foreign exchange. Restrictions on 
economic policy placed by the international banks, the IMF, or the U.S. 
embassy as the condition for more loans force austerity and devalua­
tions, which makes needed reform and growth difficult. The geopolitical 
strategies of the United States have also imposed serious external 
constraints on the region. In El Salvador, the U.S. embassy for years 
vetoed a negotiated solution to the war in favor of continuing the 
counterinsurgency program. The United States also opposed any 
significant opening of political space for many popular organizations and 
the left. In Honduras, U.S. policy was designed to make Honduras a 
forward base for U.S. strategy against Nicaragua.
Managing demands for reform in the face of such internal and 
external constraints would be a severe test even for strong, stable 
Western democracies. The "elected" governments in Central America do 
not have the remotest ability to handle such difficulties unless they 
generate the power and authority that only a transition toward greater 
democracy and more popular support could give them. What then are 
the prospects for such a transition, and what role might parties play in 
it?
If we judge electoral politics in Central America using formal 
procedural criteria drawn from Western European and North American 
electoral and party systems, we conclude that all countries except Costa 
Rica and to some extent Nicaragua are far from democratic. Further, the 
prospects for democracy are not good. Some critics are harsher. They 
brand elections like those in El Salvador as merely "demonstration 
elections"^ and describe Central America as a region of "facade 
democracies" (democradas de fachada)?'^
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Without question Central American social reality constitutes a harsh 
environment for the development of democracy. But if our criteria are 
based on a less formal, less Western European model, the prospects for 
democracy, while still difficult, appear more promising. We can define 
democracy in terms of the relationship between citizens and their leaders 
without specifying a goal or purpose. It is a system in which informed 
citizens can participate actively and effectively in making decisions that 
shape their lives and in which they can hold their leaders politically 
accountable to themselves and to laws made with the effective participa­
tion of the citizeiuy.* Further, it is a system in which there is an 
underlying consensus about who is a citizen and who can participate in 
politics, about the rules of the game for participation and accountability, 
and some rough consensus on which areas of life can be legislated and 
which are beyond the authority of the state.^ Approaching democracy 
this way incorporates the concern of the two other major approaches 
toward democracy: the formal approach, which focuses on having 
adequate procedures for setting the rules of the game for democracy, 
and the substantive approach, which recognizes the necessity for citizens 
to have the capacity to enter and play the game using the same set of 
rules.
Within our approach, we focus on three key criteria to assess the role 
of political parties in the transition to electoral democracy: effective 
participation, civic virtue, and accountability.^ Competitive elections are, 
therefore, not synonymous with democratic politics. Rather, a country 
is more democratic the more it allows and encourages such participation, 
the more widespread the underlying consensus on rules of the game and 
linuts of authority, and the more it fosters accountability. Judged by 
these criteria, the countries of Central America look varied, from 
democratic in Costa Rica to much less so in El Salvador or Guatemala.
In this transition to electoral politics, political parties could play a far 
more significant role than mere participation in competitive elections. To 
assess their prospects in a transition process to electoral democracy, the 
student of parties should address the following key questions.
I. How Can Parties Help Create Conditions 
That Might Enhance Effective Participation?
Effective political participation requires that people be allowed the 
freedom to assemble and speak, to organize associations, to formulate 
and press their demands, and to have the freedom of the press 
necessary to gain and disseminate information. It also requires institu­
tions through which these demands can be heard and considered. 
Necessary as well is a minimal level of economic resources—money and
The Transitions to "Electoral" and Democratic Politics in Central America 45
time—to allow the parties to make use of the freedom to organize and to 
utilize effectively the institutional channels for articulating their 
demands.
Elections are only one such institution, and parties only one kind of 
organization for effective political participation. Other associations 
include labor unions, peasant organizations, cooperatives, Christian base 
community groups, neighborhood groups, women's, students', and 
teacher and professional organizations—what are often called "popular" 
organizations in the Central American context. Nonelectoral institutions 
for effective participation may include legally sanctioned collective 
bargaining, local development projects directed by local organizations, 
and self-government of universities.
Honduras and especially Costa Rica have been relatively open to such 
nonparty modes of participation and have allowed freedom of assembly, 
speech, the press, and association without much fear of repression. But 
the social and economic resources to facilitate such participation are often 
not available to a large majority of the population.
In El Salvador, Guatemala, and Somoza's Nicaragua such popular 
organizations did, at times, form, but in each case, by the late 1970s, 
they had been severely repressed and there was little effective political 
participation. One consequence of the transition to electoral politics in 
El Salvador and Guatemala and of the revolution in Nicaragua, has been 
the creation of improved conditions—however limited—for such political 
participation. In El Salvador and Guatemala the military's willingness to 
allow a transition to pseudo electoral politics was in large part the result 
of a broader effort to gain international legitimacy, particularly within the 
U.S. Congress. This required a reduction in some of the most brutal 
forms of repression—death squad killings, assassinations, disappear­
ances—and the lifting of certain restrictions on the press, on the freedom 
to demonstrate, and on the right to strike. This created a political 
opening that not only allowed party activity but also the reemergence of 
participation by popular organizations. This participation is still limited 
and could be closed down again. Nevertheless the growing effectiveness 
of participation is evident in cooperatives, slum communities, refugee 
camps, and even prisons.
In Nicaragua, the revolution increased the ability of some popular 
organizations to participate and limited the effectiveness for others. 
Many of these were organized before the Sandinista party came to power 
and thus maintained an independence of the party organization; new 
ones were formed subsequent to the revolution. Still others, mostly on 
the right, ceased to exist. Organizations of small peasants and producers 
(UNAG), of growers (like the rice growers association), and of women 
(like ANMALAE), originally closely directed by the FSLN, grew
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increasingly independent and often participated effectively in decisions 
that affected the lives of their members. Other groups (both the 
communist and noncommunist opposition unions) were allowed to 
organize, but until the 1990 election their participation was limited by 
such actions as government efforts to prevent strikes and the state of 
emergency imposed during the Contra War.
Given the importance of such nonparty participation in democratic 
politics, it is important to ask how parties have helped expand condi­
tions for effective participation? Parties face two different tasks in this 
respect: first, incorporating new groupings into the political system and, 
second, expanding the political space for themselves and others to create 
a well-functioning system. It is important to examine the role parties 
play in bringing popular organizations and mass movements. Do these 
relationships provide for representation of the interests of these groups, 
or are they cooptive and controlling like Mexico's ruling Revolutionary 
Institutional Party (PRI) or Argentina under Per6n?
Trying to incorporate emerging sectors into the ongoing political fabric 
is difficult. With the exception of the Sandinistas, few parties have had 
the skill or the wherewithal to mobilize large groups of people.^ As we 
pointed out earlier, some of the parties, including "modernizing" ones 
like the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) in El Salvador, have been 
willing to accommodate other dominant power groups at the cost of 
excluding these newly emerging sectors.
Moreover, some members of society are significantly restrained from 
effective participation as a result of the structures, values, and behavior 
prevalent in other societal institutions—family, religion, and so on—that 
carry over into the political system. Class analysis will address some 
aspects of this problem, but attention should also be paid to the ways 
the society incapacitates social groupings such as women in their ability 
to participate, to overcome the institutionalized biases that may inhibit 
or prevent these social groupings from participating effectively.^^ Are 
the parties even exploring these issues? Do they have programs to 
address them?
What role do the parties play in helping expand the necessary 
conditions of effective participation—ensuring freedom of assembly, 
organization, and the press; taming the military and death squad abuses 
of human rights; ensuring access to the media and the safety of persons 
who want to organize; overcoming institutionalization biases? Although 
it is important to examine how parties seek to make it possible to 
establish broad center-left coalitions that could bring excluded leftist 
parties into the political system, it is also important to note their 
contribution to the establishment of a system in which opposition and 
dissenting parties and coalitions are, at minimum, permitted.
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In El Salvador in late 1980 attempts were made to broker an agree­
ment between the Frente Democr&tica Revolucionario (FDR) and PDC, but 
these collapsed when the military assassinated the FDR leaders in 
November of that year. In 1981, Washington sought to promote a PDC- 
ARENA (AlianzaRepublicanaNadonalista.) coalition to modernize the right­
wing/death squad oligarchy and ally its party with the Christian 
Democrats. More recently, the Convergencia Democr&tica has tried to bring 
together center-left parties and popular organizations in a united front 
to push for reforms and a negotiated solution to the war. In Nicaragua, 
the FSLN helped mobilize the involvement of formally excluded groups 
in politics. It will be interesting to see how the Unidn Nacional Oposicidn 
and its constituent parties will function under current conditions.
Finally, the parties must work to expand the base of empowered 
participants. This requires releasing the tight grip on leadership positions 
and changing the old, ineffective rules of the game. Parties must develop 
mechanisms for recruiting and training followers and leaders.
II. How Effectively Do Parties Foster Values and 
Attitudes Supportive of Democratic Civic Virtues?
A key facet of the transition to electoral democracy is the promotion 
of values and attitudes that sustain and expand democratic institutions 
and practices. Among them are the creation of a climate of trust and 
honesty, respect for the rule of law, tolerance of opposing views, and 
reliance on peaceful means for resolving political conflict, especially the 
use of negotiation and compromise.“ A student of political parties must 
explore the contribution parties might make to fostering such democratic 
civic virtue.
Honesty is essential to promoting effective participation and account­
ability. As Kalman Silvert wrote.
Lying is the most nefarious political offense....Untruths....destroy the 
possibility of creating common perceptions of political events, and therefore 
can fracture a political community at all levels of participation....Political 
falsehoods create many social events out of one empirical occurrence, 
threaten community cohesion by opening up the possibility of value 
conflicts...tend to produce erratic politics, and this...impoverishes 
individuals and societies.“
To what degree do political parties promote honesty in both their own 
behavior and in that of other politically relevant actors? In a situation 
where the government or ruling class elite lies to the citizenry, political 
parties can provide a reliable alternative source of information, giving the
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public a way to judge the validity of what they are told. Further, by 
encouraging honesty and integrity in the system and among their own 
members, they can help pass these values on to party members and to 
the rest of the society.
The events of the past two decades in Latin America have led to a 
renewed commitment to the rule of law by those who seek to move 
away from authoritarianism toward a democratic order. Arbitrariness and 
inequity in the application of power and the great difficulty of stopping 
military and vigilante forces from regularly taking the law into their own 
hands underline the importance of an effective legal system for electoral 
democracy.^
The law sets the rules defining the nature of legitimate participation 
and the mechanisms through which leadership can be held accountable. 
To what degree do the political parties actively support the rule of law, 
even in the face of strong opposition or a losing decision? To what 
degree do they demonstrate their commitment and support for the rule 
of law by their behavior within the party itself? How do the parties seek 
to transmit this value to their own adherents as well as to other 
members of the nation?
In democratic electoral politics diversity and dissent are to be 
celebrated, not suppressed. As Kalman Silvert argues, democratic politics 
"should be seen not as the art of guiding the use of legitimized force, but 
as the art of promoting and synthesizing difference. Dissent not only 
permits the consideration of alternative policy options, it can also 
provide correction in the system for inaccurate or misleading informa­
tion—whether the inaccuracies or misinformation were purposeful or not. 
In this latter sense, dissent is important to accountability. In the former 
sense it is a key to effective participation. In both cases, the valuing of 
dissent is a critical civic virtue.
To what degree then are parties supporting the presentation of 
dissenting views? To what degree do they encourage this within the 
deliberations of the party itself? How, if at all, are they attempting to 
pass on the importance of tolerating, if not encouraging, dissent?
Conflict among differing ideas is essential to accountability. Indeed, 
conflict is a normal part of democratic processes. What is important 
about conflict is not that it occurs, but that it is bounded by an accep­
tance of the rules of the game, which require settling disputes peace­
fully, through the political process. Many Chileans learned this lesson 
during the Pinochet years. Members of parties that had engaged in 
conflict with other parties to the point of political homicide began to 
realize that although the struggle was important, having an arena in 
which such conflicts could take place was even more important than the 
outcome of a particular fight. ^
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Respect for the rights of others to hold different views and to seek 
different policies means accepting victory without trying to destroy the 
opposition and accepting defeat knowing that other opportunities to 
compete will not be denied. The presence of an arena for the resolution 
of political conflict through negotiation and compromise must be more 
highly valued than victory on any specific issue.* Students of parties 
need to examine the efforts parties make to stimulate the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts; to support a process of negotiation and compro­
mise as opposed to arbitrary rule, the use of force, or the political 
extinction of opposition; and to promote the use of an open political 
process to resolve disputes within the party.
HI. How Can Parties Help Create Conditions 
That Enhance Political Accountability?
Accountability is more difficult for political parties to effect than is 
participation or the promotion of civic virtue. Nonetheless, political 
parties are central actors in political life and their role is a crucial one. 
Throughout much of Central America's history, governments have either 
been the province of the relatively few privileged members of society or 
caretakers accountable "to either the military, the oligarchy, the private 
external financial interests with investments in the country, or some 
combination of these groups.
Attempting to hold regimes accountable in the Central American 
context may be not only dangerous, but in some cases may also be futile. 
The "lack of internal structures for promoting and fostering open 
discussions about political issues" has been a persistent problem. "Few 
of the region's countries have allowed for ongoing debate and discussion 
among moderates and the non-revolutionary left."®^ In some cases 
political actors have turned to the international arena to bolster their 
efforts to hold regimes accountable.*
Finally, the issue of accountability cannot be resolved without 
considering the role of the United States. As the preeminent, most 
powerful external actor in the region, the United States has had a 
profound impact in each of the Central American nations.* Traditional­
ly the U.S. embassy has been such a major player that it has, all too 
often, inhibited the development of internal political accountability of the 
government to the local citizenry and nation. As Rosenberg observes.
In Central America, the United States has unrivaled political power and 
resources and represents one of the largest economic enterprises in each 
country....The U.S. ambassador is one of the most studied figures in each 
country. The embassy itself, its staff, programs, and aid activities, are
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analyzed, scrutinized, and then hustled by locals who specialize in 
"working" the U.S. institution....National politicians and military officials 
inevitably spend as much time cultivating U.S. embassy clientele and 
visiting dignitaries as they do with their own nationals. ®
To maintain the integrity of a nation's electoral democracy, accountability 
to the United States must be substantially subordinated to accountability 
to the citizens of the country.
Conclusion
We have endeavored to accomplish two tasks in this chapter; first, to 
show the significant changes that have taken place in the context in 
which political parties operate in Central America in the past several 
decades and, second, to provide a framework and series of questions by 
which one can assess the role parties can play in a transition from 
pseudo or limited electoral politics to more fully democratic politics. 
Answers to the three overarching questions—concerning effective 
participation, civic virtue, and accountability—will help us understand 
that phenomenon.
As the transition from pseudo to linuted to democratic politics occurs, 
greater numbers of individuals and groups participate and accountability 
grows. Therefore, the closer one comes to democratic electoral politics, 
the more social forces there are with which to compete, and all political 
participants, including political parties, become more empowered.
Any reasonable assessment of the role of political parties in promoting 
a transition to democracy must recognize the limited impact they can 
have. Parties are only one of many actors, and they are not autonomous 
and are composed of a relatively small number of adherents. Finally, 
their power to act in the system is also circumscribed by the broader, 
external socioeconomic and political context, which includes actors such 
as the United States.
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